The Left says that it’s “the most Right-wing government of the Fifth Republic” or even “a Far-Right government”. Piffle.

The Far Right says that it is another “Macronist government”, a re-heating of the failed, centrist left-overs of the last seven years. That is partly true but misleading.

Media commentators say that this is a “coalition of losers”. But who “won” the June-July election? No one did really.

Both Left and Far Right say that it is a “doomed government”. They have, if they band together, enough votes in the National Assembly to bring down Michel Barnier and his 39 ministers whenever they choose.

But that would be a coalition of enemies. Is the Left prepared to ally with the Far Right to censure a government which it accuses of being Far Right? Is the Far Right ready to vote with the Left to destroy a government which promises to be tough on illegal immigration?

Maybe they are.

Let’s cut through the piffle all the same. Let’s recall the muddled political and parliamentary realities created, accidentally or not, by the indecisive, early parliamentary elections on June 30th/July 7th.

Let’s also recall that French government finances are in an unprecedented mess – an unprecedented mess but not an insoluble one.

This is makeshift, struggle-through government which reflects the political opinions of those willing to take the risk of governing rather than shouting.

The new National Assembly, which meets from next Tuesday, is divided into three-and-a-half ideological blocs. None has enough seats to govern alone.

The Left, with one third of the seats in the new Assembly, was unwilling to work with President Emmanuel Macron’s centre. The Far Right, which had hoped to govern alone, ended up with 142 seats out of 577. Marine Le Pen was unwilling to work with anyone else and no one was willing to work with her.

Macron might have appointed a Left and Centre government but the Left refused serious compromise on its suicidal economic programme. It was therefore inevitable that France would end up with “another” government of the Centre and Centre-right.

In his first term in 2017-22, Macron had two Prime Ministers from the Centre-right; in his second term he had two Prime Ministers originally from the Centre Left governing in uneasy cooperation with the Centre-right.

This government has an independent Centre-right Prime minister. It has Centre-right ministers in three key posts, including interior. An ex-centre-right minister, Rachida Dati, stays on at the culture minister. An independent centre-left politician, Didier Migaud, becomes justice minister.

Right-wingers and stunt riders: Who’s who in the new French government?

All the other top posts – 14 out of 19 – go to the three parties in Macron’s centrist coalition with 11 for Macron’s Renaissance party alone.

So where is the “change” that the French people voted for? Good question. It IS odd, democratically-speaking, that President Macron should have “lost” the June-July election and that his alliance should remain partially or largely in power.  

But some sort of coalition was inevitable. Centrist parties tend to be involved in coalitions because they are, er, in the centre. The French people voted for “change” in the abstract but did not agree on what the “changes” should be.

The Barnier government, muddled in its making and short-lived in its prospects, reflects the landscape of French politics post-2017. Left and Right no longer rule. France is divided into three broad blocs, Radical Left, Far Right and the reformist, muddle-through Centre.

The fault lines of these blocs are fluid. Politicians and voters on the moderate, pro-European Left have more in common with Macron’s centre than with Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s “tear-it-all-down”, hard Left. They don’t always admit it.

Politicians and voters on the moderate pro-European right have more in common with the centre than with Marine Le Pen’s populist-nationalist-racist Far Right. They are reluctant to say so.

The Barnier government is a shift to the Right within this centre-ground. It lacks strong centre-left personalities. As several commentators have pointed out, it is trimaran with no left-hand float or hull. That was inevitable after several politicians of the Centre-left refused offers of big jobs.

On the right, the new government has a very strong and very conservative personality in Bruno Retailleau, the interior minister. Retailleau’s view on migration and security and Europe are little different from those of Le Pen. On many social issues, such as gay marriage or abortion, he is further to the right than she is.

Retailleau is in the government because he is a senior figure from the Centre-right, ex-Gaullists, now called the Republican Right. He was given the interior ministry to try to prevent Le Pen from joining the Left in a censure motion.

His presence alone does not make the Barnier government hard or Far Right. On taxation and the budget, all the signs are that this government will be less hard-line “liberal” in economic terms than its predecessors.

The Barnier government, like the four Macron governments since 2017, is a government of the reformist, managerial, muddle-through, broad centre.

It is a Barnier government, not just a Macron government. But the greatest part of its maximum 230 supporters in the Assembly come from Macron’s centrist coalition. It is therefore inevitably a sort-of Macron government, not just a Barnier government.

It is the most fragile administration of the Fifth Republic at a time when strong, painful decisions need to be taken to prevent a French financial crisis. 

The real question is not whether Barnier’s team is Far Right or Macronist. The real question is whether Barnier’s “muddle-through government” can muddle-through.